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Symposium
Too Big to Jail: Overcoming the Roadblocks to
Regulatory Enforcement
INTRODUCTION: CONNECTING THE DOTS BETWEEN TWO
PARALLEL WORLDS
RENA STEINZOR ∗
I. THE DEREGULATORY BRIDGE ACROSS FINANCE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT
I am privileged to introduce the written product of an unusual
Symposium co-sponsored by the Maryland Law Review and the Center
1
for Progressive Reform. As far as we know, the event is the first effort
by the academy to make explicit the cross-cutting issues that undermine effective regulation and enforcement regarding the financial
services sector and polluting industries. We were able to assemble an
eclectic group of leading scholars in both arenas, and especially appreciate the participation of Brooksley Born, former Chairwoman of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, who served as a modern day Cassandra during the lead-up to the financial meltdown of
2008. Had self-styled titans of finance like Alan Greenspan, Lawrence
Summers, and Robert Rubin given more credence to her warnings of
the dire collapse that lay just around the corner, the world would be a
2
better place today. Threshold plaudits are also due to Professor MiCopyright © 2013 by Rena Steinzor.
∗ Professor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
1. Founded in 2002, the Center for Progressive Reform is a network of sixty scholars
across the nation dedicated to protecting health, safety, and the environment through
analysis and commentary. It has a small professional staff funded by foundations. Contributing authors Thomas McGarity and Victor Flatt are members of the organization and
I am its president. For more information about CPR’s mission, goals, and activities, see
http://www.progressivereform.org.
2. The story of Born’s efforts was the focus of the 2009 PBS documentary “The Warning.” Frontline: The Warning (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/.
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chael Greenberger, who served as Chairwoman Born’s senior adviser
during those troubled times and now teaches law at the University of
Maryland Carey School of Law, and to Anne Havemann, Maryland
Law Review Editor in Chief, and Brendan Hogan, Executive Articles
and Symposium Editor, without whose tireless work the Symposium
would not have been possible.
On the surface, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have little in
common. The first is the defiant poster child for regulation-runamok, while the second is the powerful, if often sleepy, watchdog of
Wall Street. Turn the telescope around, though, and the similarities
between the root causes of the two agencies’ institutional failures are
3
startling. A powerful brew of political hostility and funding short4
falls hobble them despite the fact that the need for vigorous oversight in both arenas has never been more urgent. Indeed, if we believe the findings of the world’s pre-eminent scientists and
economists, our obstinate neglect of climate change solutions in the
face of global economic insecurity will cost us more in the long run
5
than we seem to be able to imagine.
So what exactly is wrong with the lead actors in the regulatory
state assigned to supervise reckless deals and harmful pollution? The
SEC’s failure to anticipate, much less mitigate, the economic collapse
of 2008 was most unfortunate, although it was just one among several
agencies blinded by the complexity of the mechanisms used to engineer the “bubble” that burst so disastrously. The agency’s weakness in
the aftermath of the crisis is as inexplicable as it is unforgiveable. It
failed to take enforcement action against Lehman Brothers, a firm at
the epicenter of the financial meltdown; entered a sweetheart deal
with Countrywide Financial chief executive Angelo Mozilo, who
spearheaded the accumulation of junk mortgages that were at the
heart of the crisis; and destroyed records of enforcement actions it
had closed, including cases involving Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo,

3. For a discussion of “bureaucracy bashing” by hostile politicians, see RENA
STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT,
AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 126–29 (2010).
4. Id. at 54–72.
5. Fiona Harvey, Climate Change Is Already Damaging Global Economy, Report Finds,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/sep/26/
climate-change-damaging-global-economy.
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Bank of America, Deutsche Bank, Lehman Brothers, and the SAC
6
Capital hedge fund.
Far from using the crisis to rediscover its core mission, the SEC
has swayed under the relentless political pressure of financiers who
have embraced the adage “the best defense is a good offense” with
unprecedented and unrelenting determination. In fact, as I write
these words, the New York Times editorial page has excoriated newly
appointed SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White for her decision to defer
the supervision of international derivatives trading to the weaker laws
7
of the nations where the transactions occur. Coupled with the government’s massive bailout of mismanaged firms, the agency’s dismal
record sends the signal that a second, third, or fourth crisis might cost
the losers on Wall Street money but will make other players rich.
Meanwhile, in the wake of the latest round of across-the-board
budget cuts known as the “sequester,” the head of EPA’s Criminal Investigation Division has acknowledged the existence of “significant
8
geographic regions we can no longer cover.” Subject to a double
pincer attack on its authority and resources, EPA’s every move is controlled by skittish political operatives within the White House, who
repeatedly delay and weaken regulations the agency’s authorizing
9
statutes command it to write. As I write these words, Senate Republicans are doing their best to block confirmation of Gina McCarthy, a
long-time career bureaucrat who has worked for elected officials from
both parties and is President Obama’s nominee for EPA Administra10
tor.

6. Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Mary Schapiro’s SEC: Its 6 Biggest Blunders—So Far, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2011), available at http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/
2011/09/12/Mary-Schapiros-SEC-Its-6-Biggest-Blunders-So-Far.aspx#page2.
7. Editorial, A Disappointing Debut, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2013, at A26,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/opinion/a-disappointing-debut-at-the-sec.html?
partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=0.
8. John McArdle, EPA: “There are Significant Geographic Regions We Can No Longer Cover”—Agency’s Top Cop, CLIMATEWIRE, May 6, 2013, http://www.eenews.net/public/
Greenwire/2013/05/06/1?page_type=print.
9. See, e.g., RENA STEINZOR, JAMES GOODWIN & MICHAEL PATOKA, CTR. FOR
PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE: HOW POLITICS
TRUMPS PROTECTION OF PUBLIC HEALTH, WORKER SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2011),
available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/OIRA_Meetings_1111.pdf.
10. See John M. Broder, Senate Panel Advances Nominee for E.P.A. N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/us/politics/senate-panel-advances-nomineefor-epa.html?_r=0 (describing Republican opposition); Sherwood Boehlert, Op-Ed, GOP
Must End Gina McCarthy Obstruction, POLITICO, May 16, 2013, http://www.politico.com/
story/2013/05/epa-gop-gina-mccarthy-obstruction-91461.html (describing McCarthy’s
record of reaching across the aisle).
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Because the content of their missions is so different, the root
causes of the agencies’ dysfunction may appear to have little in common. The SEC’s struggle to master the convoluted assessment of financial risks posed by new investment vehicles and EPA’s faltering efforts to reduce toxic emissions differ fundamentally in execution and
result. Big money is made in SEC’s bailiwick. Big money can only be
lost if regulated industries fail to thwart EPA’s momentum. The SEC
is viewed as a necessary evil—few would advocate a totally free marketplace—while EPA’s opponents seem determined to stop it in its
tracks. Few venture onto the unstable bridge that links the two and is
just beginning to emerge as a central project of trade associations
founded to keep government off their members’ backs.
Powerful institutions like the Chamber of Commerce recognized
the potential for cross-fertilization of people and ideas between the
two arenas some time ago, well before their counterparts in the public
11
interest community glimpsed those connections. The fading core of
the nation’s industrial base—the heavy-duty manufacturing sector—
has long experience with the potent strategy of exploiting economic
downturns to convince the public that jobs and a clean environment
cannot co-exist. Having constructed an updated version of the deregulatory bandwagon with the help of the traditional conservative
coalition that now dominates the Republican Party, foresighted manufacturers were only too happy to welcome investment bankers on
board. Weakening the statutory requirements commonly known as
“Dodd-Frank” has become as important a priority for the Chambers’
12
deregulatory staff as undermining EPA’s “job killing” initiatives.

11. See, e.g., Thomas J. Donohue, Regulations Devastate Economic Growth, U.S. CHAMBER
COM. (Oct. 14, 2010), http:// www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/regulations-devastate
-economic-growth (condemning the “regulatory hurricane” that threatens the U.S. economy); JAMES GATTUSO ET AL., HERITAGE FOUND., RED TAPE RISING: OBAMA’S TORRENT OF
NEW REGULATION (2010), http:// www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/10/red-taperising-obamas-torrent-of-new-regulation (contending that burden of regulation has grown
at alarming rate); STEPHEN F. HAYWARD, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., THE EPA’S
POWER GRAB (2009), http:// www.aei.org/article/101456 (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (condemning EPA’s proposals to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
12. Compare CTR. FOR CAPITAL MARKETS’ COMPETITIVENESS, FAR AGENDA 2013 (2013),
http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/CCMC_FAR_
Agenda-2013.pdf (proposing regulatory and statutory fixes to Dodd-Frank), with U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, IMPACTS OF REGULATIONS ON EMPLOYMENT, EXAMINING EPA’S
OFT-REPEATED CLAIMS THAT REGULATIONS CREATE JOBS (2013), http://www.uschamber.
com/sites/default/files/reports/020360_ETRA_Briefing_NERA_Study_final.pdf (reviewing EPA’s methodology for measuring the impact of a regulation and concluding that the
agency’s methods are “flawed” and replete with “striking omissions and inconsistencies”).
OF
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II. DEREGULATION AS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE GLOBAL
RECESSION
Our Symposium begins with Brooksley Born’s analysis of how the
2008 meltdown came about and the reasons why the revival of stringent regulation and enforcement are necessary to prevent another
crash. Born bases her analysis on her first-hand observations as a high
13
profile attorney for financial industry clients, her service as Chairwoman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the late
1990s, and, especially, her participation as one of ten Commissioners
appointed by the President and congressional leadership to serve on
14
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”).
She explains how Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve for two decades, as well as a “laissez-faire economist” and “Ayn
15
Rand disciple,” fostered the belief that financial markets could selfregulate. Eventually, this mantra was embraced by the entire financial
sector, which spent the astounding sum of $2.7 billion on federal lobbying efforts at the same time that financial services employees made
more than $1 billion in federal election campaign contributions. This
flood of cash produced deregulatory “gaps” that nurtured what Born
16
describes as a “lightly regulated shadow banking system.” In just a
few short years, this alternative system was trading so-called “over-thecounter derivatives” at a level that rivaled “the traditional banking sys17
tem in size and importance.”

13. Brooksley E. Born, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, http://www.arnoldporter.com/
professionals.cfm?action=view&id=557.
14. The FCIC was created by the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, which
was signed into law by President Obama on May 20, 2009. Pub. L. No. 111-21 (2009).
Born was appointed by then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). Press Release, Democrats, Reid, Pelosi Announce Appointments to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(July 15, 2009), available at http://democrats.senate.gov/2009/07/15/reid-pelosiannounce-appointments-to-the-financial-crisis-inquiry-commission/ (last visited May 21,
2013). The FCIC’s final report was issued on January 27, 2011; the Commission split six to
four along partisan lines in voting its approval of the report. Get the Report, U.S. FIN. CRISIS
INQUIRY COMM’N, http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/report (last visited May 21, 2013).
Astoundingly, the report became a bestseller on lists maintained by both The New York
Times and The Washington Post. Best Sellers: Paperback Nonfiction, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2011);
Christopher Schoppa, Best Sellers, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2011. Jeff Madrick, writing in The
New York Review of Books, hailed it as “the most comprehensive indictment of the American
financial failure that has yet been made.” Jeff Madick, The Wall Street Leviathan, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/apr/28/wallstreet-leviathan/.
15. Brooksley Born, Keynote Address, 72 MD. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2013).
16. Id. at 1165.
17. Id.
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Born and the FCIC majority lament the grave reluctance of over18
Her first
sight agencies to “police” grossly problematic practices.
and most important example is the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”),
which had the authority to police mortgage terms and was “well aware
of widespread abuses in mortgage lending practices,” but did noth19
ing. In this vacuum, fraudulent mortgage lenders pushed unqualified borrowers to sign balloon loans that they could never repay, and
20
then resold the loans to investors known as “mortgage securitizers.”
The bad paper was then sold and resold, divided into tranches, recharacterized and hedged, until its core weakness—mortgagee insol21
vency—became invisible. Born points out that current Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke admitted to the FCIC that the FRB’s
neglect of the mortgage market during the housing boom was a “se22
vere failure.”
Born similarly condemns the SEC for failing to ensure that mortgage securitizers gave adequate disclosures to the investors that
23
bought their junk paper. Instead, she says that the agency relied on
“shelf registration” provisions and exemptions from registration that
allowed multiple public offerings without adequate investor disclo24
sure. She explains that the FCIC attributed the extraordinarily rapid
growth of the OTC derivatives market to its deregulation by the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. By June 2008, the
“explosive growth” of the OTC derivatives market had reached an
astounding $650 trillion, “more than ten times the gross domestic
25
product of all the countries in the world.” This deregulation and its
utterly foreseeable consequences were “key turning point[s] in the
26
march toward the financial crisis.”
The SEC also committed grave errors with respect to the country’s largest investment banks, which grew with “little or no supervi27
sion except for their securities operations.” The five largest banks
were so bloated with bad debt that they ultimately “disappeared” during the financial crisis, either going bankrupt (Lehman Brothers), be18. Id. at 1164.
19. Id. at 1165–66.
20. Id. at 1165.
21. For a full description of this dynamic, see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE
THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010).
22. Born, supra note 15, at 1166.
23. Id. at 1165.
24. Id. at 1167.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1168.
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ing acquired under emergency circumstances (that is, a buyers’ market) by large bank holding companies (Bear Stearns and Merrill
Lynch), or converting themselves to bank holding companies and
submitting to the supervision of the FRB (Goldman Sachs and Mor28
gan Stanley).
As tempting as it is to believe that these incidents of catastrophic
regulatory neglect will be prevented by the new authorities regulators
received when their authorizing statutes were reformed by the passage
of Dodd-Frank, Born is not especially sanguine about such progress.
In addition to the cash that still floods the political system, inspiring
multiple efforts to repeal portions of Dodd-Frank, Born worries that
Congress will find oblique methods, such as cutting agency budgets,
29
to undermine the work of federal regulators. With so much money
at stake, such cuts seem as far removed from legitimate deficit concerns as they are closely related to deregulatory ambitions. And, of
course, funding cuts will only make it more difficult for federal regulators to overcome their deeply entrenched “muscle memory” of
keeping a low profile rather than mounting tough and ambitious enforcement of new and old rules.
III. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RE-REGULATING THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR
Our next author, Wallace Turbeville, 30 explains the implications
of cost-benefit analysis for future financial services regulation. This
methodology is among the most powerful elements of the crosscutting deregulatory campaign mounted by business groups—crosscutting because the playbook for its application was developed in the
context of health, safety, and environmental regulation, especially
31
with respect to EPA’s activities.
In a report entitled The Importance of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation, Paul Rose and Christopher Walker, professors at the
Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and fellows of the Cham28. Id. at 1169.
29. Id. at 1170–72.
30. Turbeville is a lawyer and financial services expert who has worked in the financial
services industry since 1978. He practiced law for seven years and then joined Goldman
Sachs as an investment banker specializing in infrastructure finance and public/private
partnerships. He is now a Senior Fellow at Demos, a nonprofit advocating reform in the
financial services industry. For more information about its programs and views, see
http://www.demos.org/about-demos.
31. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING
ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2010), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/
vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf.
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ber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets’ Competitiveness, refer
with enthusiasm to the leadership of Harvard Law School Professor
Cass Sunstein, an early architect of cost-benefit analysis in the envi32
ronmental field. Eager to translate theory into practice, Sunstein
headed the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) during President Barack
33
Obama’s first term. He is now back teaching at Harvard.
Sunstein’s strong commitment to cost-benefit analysis is best expressed in his 2005 book, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, where he writes that environmental laws are the product of powerful and irrational social forces caused by the average citizen’s overre34
Because non-experts succumb to irrational
overreaction to risk.
panic in response to improbable risk, “the public’s demand for government intervention can be greatly affected by probability neglect,
so that regulators may end up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intense emotional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the (low) probability that dangers will ever come to
35
fruition.” Sunstein sees these reactions as so extreme that he recommends preventing the public from influencing government decisions that involve such risks: “[T]here is [a risk that] high levels of
public participation in technical domains [will] simply heighten pub36
His tool for
lic fear, with unfortunate consequences for policy.”
achieving this troubling goal is cost-benefit analysis.
Sunstein, of course, did not bring cost-benefit analysis to the fore
of White House regulatory review. Rather, its genesis was in response
to the landmark legislation passed in the wake of Watergate and the
Vietnam War, a period that saw the creation of EPA, the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administra37
tion. Gradually, over four decades, the application of this flawed

32. PAUL ROSE & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, CTR. FOR CAPITAL MARKETS’
COMPETITIVENESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
(2013).
33. For a description of his tenure there, see Dan Froomkin, Cass Sunstein: The Obama
Administration’s Ambivalent Regulator, HUFFINGTON POST (June 13, 2011, 10:51 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/13/cass-sunstein-obama-ambivalent-regulatorczar_n_874530.html.
34. CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
35. Id. at 69.
36. Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1161 (2002) (reviewing
PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)).
37. For a history of regulatory review, see Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209 (2012).
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38

methodology has become increasingly elaborate and formal.
Despite its entrenchment as a hurdle to surmount before a proposed or
final rule is published in the Federal Register, the methodology has
39
come under heavy fire as a tool for killing protective regulation.
Critics of cost-benefit analysis in the health and safety arena deplore its tendency to overstate costs and understate benefits. They argue that all the number crunching produces estimates that appear
precise but are in truth the product of inaccurate, opaque, and even
morally objectionable assumptions. They argue that cost-benefit analysis pushes the regulatory system in only one direction: toward weakening protections in order to lower industry compliance costs.
In an effort to justify the migration of such analyses to the financial services arena, the Rose and Walker report explains that financial
regulatory agencies are independent, and therefore labor under the
misimpression that they are immune from the methodology that applies to Executive Branch agencies. They urge sweeping reform:
For more than three decades—under both Democratic and
Republican administrations—cost-benefit analysis has been a
fundamental tool of effective regulation. . . . Through the
use of cost-benefit analysis in financial services regulation,
regulators can determine if their proposals will actually work
to solve the problem they are seeking to address. . . . The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) only elevates the importance of
cost-benefit analysis in financial regulation. By requiring
nearly 400 rulemakings spread across more than 20 regulatory agencies, implementing Dodd-Frank is an unprecedented challenge for both regulators and regulated entities. . . .
Although financial market regulators have not entirely
avoided the influence of cost benefit analysis, for largely historical reasons they have adopted the method both more
40
slowly and more haphazardly than many other agencies.
Turbeville’s article strides right to the fundamental article of
faith for those advocating the stringent application of cost-benefit
analysis to financial rules to prevent re-regulation—the “Efficient
41
Market Hypothesis.” Espoused by Alan Greenspan, among others,

38. Id. at 238–68.
39. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004); Richard W. Parker, Grading the
Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345 (2003).
40. ROSE & WALKER, supra note 32, at v, 5–6.
41. Wallace Turbeville, A New Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Financial Regulation:
Inefficiency of Capital Intermediation in a Deregulated System, 72 MD. L. REV. 1173, 1183 (2013).
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this theory posits that if the market for financial services is allowed to
operate unimpeded, efficiency—and cost-savings for customers—are
optimized. A similar theory—that the only justification for regulation
is when the “free” market “fails” has also been advanced by far-right
42
conservatives in the environmental arena.
Turbeville argues that if the flawed notion that unregulated financial markets are the epitome of efficiency is incorporated into the
system for evaluating new rules, cost-benefit analyses will result in onedimensional comparisons between the costs incurred by regulated industries and the far more attenuated benefits of preventing outright
43
fraud. Instead, he says that the correct yardstick for measuring the
benefits of such rules is the extent to which they prevent excessive
draining of capital from the economy to pay bankers for facilitating
deals. Known as “intermediation,” which Turbeville describes as “the
plumbing that connects capital sources to capital uses,” these sums
can be quite large and—more to the point—larger than they need to
44
be.
In agreement with the market analysis offered by Born, Turbeville observes that the abandonment of the Glass-Steagall Act gave rise
to a small number of very large “multifunctional ‘universal’ banks”
that wield tremendous market power, allowing them to withdraw ex45
cessive value from the intermediation process. He notes that the financial sector’s share of aggregate Gross Domestic Product has been
in the range of 8.3% in recent years, an increase from historic levels
46
of 4.1%. The difference between the two figures is the result of unwarranted and excessive profits that impose great costs—or, in costbenefit analysis language—forestall great benefits from the society as
a whole.
Turbeville’s analysis suggests that to remain useful to policymakers, cost-benefit analysis of financial service sector rules must consider
a significantly broader definition of regulatory beneficiaries than the
banking industry would recognize. Or, in other words, such analyses
must find a way of measuring not just the increased compliance costs
imposed on the financial sector, but the liberated intermediation
costs—or benefits to the productive capacity of the society as a
whole—that would result from a regulatory proposal.
42. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2001).
43. Turbeville, supra note 41, at 1177.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1178.
46. Id. at 1179.
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It is easy to anticipate the central technocratic objections of
bankers to this proposal—namely, the difficulty of quantifying the difference between justifiable and unjustified intermediation costs. But
Turbeville reports that a variety of economists have developed models
designed to measure such costs over sufficiently lengthy periods that
factors influencing their steady escalation can be teased out, meas47
ured, and (hopefully) eliminated. For example, Professor Thomas
Philippon has adapted a neoclassical growth model to measure such
costs in the United States over an 140-year period, producing a Financial Intermediation Cost Index that estimates the unit price of such
48
services over time. It shows that the index has been trending upward, especially since the 1970s, a result Philippon finds anomalous
given the efficiencies that should have occurred as a result of advances in information technology. Philippon concludes that increases are
primarily due to excessive trading. Turbeville argues that the two best
proofs of Philippon’s theory are the manic derivatives trading and
hedging that preceded the 2008 crisis and so-called “high-frequency
trading,” which is triggered automatically based on algorithms built
49
into the computer systems used by large investment houses. The latter practice caused the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010, during which the
50
Dow Jones Average plunged 1000 points in a matter of minutes.
IV. RESTORING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT
Turning to an examination of how deregulatory pressures have
undercut environmental protection, we have three authors who together account for decades of experience in academia and in practice: Thomas McGarity, the Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Endowed
51
Chair in Administrative Law at the University of Texas; David
Uhlmann, Jeffrey F. Liss Professor from Practice at the University of
52
Michigan; and Victor Flatt, Tom and Elizabeth Taft Distinguished
47. Id. at 1186–94.
48. Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory
and Management of Financial Intermediation (May 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/Finance_Efficiency.pdf.
49. Turbeville, supra note 41, at Parts IV, V.
50. Id. at 1190.
51. Professor McGarity has taught at the school since 1980, and is among the leading
scholars in the country regarding regulatory design in theory and as applied. He has written dozens of articles and several books, most recently Freedom to Harm: The Lasting Legacy
of the Laissez Faire Revival (2013). He is a founder and past president of the Center for
Progressive Reform, supra note 1.
52. Professor Uhlmann is also the Director of the Environmental Law and Policy Program at the school. He joined the Michigan faculty following a seventeen-year stint at the
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Professor of Environmental Law at the University of North Carolina
53
Chapel Hill. Professors McGarity and Uhlmann explore the protracted difficulties regulators encounter in civil and criminal enforcement, while Professor Flatt closes the Symposium with thoughts
about how the abstract interests at stake in such cases can lead to public apathy, to the detriment of the political will needed to sustain
them.
Professor McGarity’s topic is the lengthy, star-crossed effort to
bring U.S. power plants into compliance with the Clean Air Act’s “new
source” standards. Undermined by a series of political reversals at the
top of the EPA leadership, enforcement actions begun during the
second term of the Clinton administration were suppressed during
54
the two-term presidency of George W. Bush. But the resilience of
EPA’s career staff maintained their vitality and, demonstrating the
power of single-minded prosecutorial commitment, brought them to
fruition close to two decades after they began.
To understand why an enforcement sweep against power plants
for upgrading their equipment would trigger such massive and sustained resistance, it is helpful to know at the threshold that coal-fired
plants were “grandfathered” into the Clean Air Act, meaning that they
55
did not have to retrofit to clean up their emissions. Such plants also
operated far longer than anyone expected; some are now in their
sixth decade of use, roughly twice as long as the predictions of their
useful lives were when Congress originally considered their status un56
der the Act. Siting a new plant is quite difficult, leaving utilities in a
situation where constant repairs and upgrades were essential.
The EPA’s efforts to define when pollution control retrofits were
required by changes that in effect rendered an existing unit a “new
source” for regulatory purposes were embattled from the start be57
cause the installation of new technology could cost millions. With
respect to power plants, Professor McGarity reports, this process be-

U.S. Department of Justice, with the last seven spent as chief of the Environmental Crimes
Section.
53. Professor Flatt is also the Director of the Center for Law, Environment, Adaptation, and Resources at the school. He previously taught at the University of Houston Law
School and holds an appointment as a Distinguished Scholar in Carbon Markets and Trading at Houston’s Bauer College of Business.
54. Thomas O. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works Better than Weak Regulation: The
EPA/DOJ New Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 MD. L. REV. 1204 (2013).
55. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., BREATH OF FRESH AIR 11–12 (2003).
56. McGarity, supra note 54, at 1219–20; NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 56,
at 117.
57. McGarity, supra note 54, at 1209.
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came “far and away the most controversial standard” in the Clean Air
Act because electric utilities play a crucial role in maintaining the
high American standard of living while simultaneously relying on coal
58
as their chief fuel, despite the fact that coal heavily pollutes the air.
If EPA allowed utility owners and operators to patch and fix their
plants without interfering, so that essentially new units were never required to install state of the art pollution control devices, health-based
standards for clean air would become unachievable.
Professor McGarity traces the evolution of an exceptionally complicated set of regulatory guidance documents governing the determination that so-called “routine maintenance” had crossed the line
59
into the territory of constructing a new source. With federal regulators hot on the trail of such violations, some utilities were able to
strike “sweetheart settlement deals” with state environmental agencies
60
before the Department of Justice could file a complaint. Nevertheless, EPA enforcement staff worked overtime to hustle as many cases
as possible to court before the advent of the second Bush presidency.
Their anxiety was justified on the last day of 2002 when a separate
part of EPA, acting at the request of the White House, issued a “Safe
Harbor” proposal that substantially undermined some of the pending
61
enforcement cases. For the remaining years of the Bush administration, enforcement staff struggled to develop and file cases even as the
62
regulatory staff wrote new guidance to undermine those efforts.
Federal efforts were bolstered by aggressive state enforcement and
private citizen suits. With the election of Barack Obama, enforcement lost its ambivalence, and in 2009, EPA and the Justice Department announced a new “national initiative, targeting electric utilities
whose coal-fired power plants violate the law.” Many of those cases are
ongoing.
The cases ended up delivering huge benefits to public health and
the environment. The EPA ultimately took enforcement actions
against about forty-five percent, or 467, of the coal-fired electricity
63
generating “units” in service. (A power plant can have more than
one generating unit and the largest have several.) The companies
agreed to spend $12.8 billion on pollution controls and pay about $80

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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64

million in fines. The EPA estimates that when the settlements are
fully implemented, they will reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by more
than 1.8 million tons and nitrogen oxide emissions by 596,000 tons,
both on an annual basis, saving thousands of lives and avoiding tens
65
of thousands of cases of respiratory disease.
Beyond these impressive benefits, the power plant new source
enforcement project should teach us the lesson that any time a regulatory agency is plagued by controversy—as EPA has been through
most of its history and as SEC and other financial sector regulatory
bodies are rapidly becoming—regulated industries respond with entrenched resistance to standard enforcement not just in court, but before Congress and at the White House. In an article tracking the expensive battle over bank card debit fees published in 2012, Professor
McGarity calls this kind of epic battle “administrative law as ‘blood
66
sport.’” The story he tells about the new-source enforcement project
might be called “blood sport enforcement.”
Despite the tortuous process imposed on EPA enforcement by
bitter industry resistance and blatant political interference, Professor
McGarity identifies the benefits of such cases that extend far beyond
the relief won by the government with respect to any particular power
67
plant. Chief among them is the “general deterrence” achieved within the industry as a whole as companies that are not involved in specif68
ic prosecutions take preventive measures to remain out of trouble.
And, of course, once they have taken expensive steps to improve their
compliance, enforcement must continue to maintain a level playing
field competitively.
Professor McGarity explains that a major advantage for regulators who choose enforcement over rulemaking is the absence of
69
White House interference in such cases. In fact, he reveals, internal
White House rules actually prohibit political staffers from contacting
agencies about pending enforcement actions unless they receive pre70
clearance from the White House counsel’s office. Given the growing
challenges of blood sport policymaking, this advantage can only increase in importance.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport, Policy Erosion in a Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1671 (2012).
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Professor David Uhlmann shifts readers to the parallel world of
criminal enforcement, broadening the scope from EPA to encompass
health and safety violations that cause extreme catastrophes, such as
the massive explosion that killed thirty miners at Massey Energy’s Up71
per Big Branch mine in Montcoal, West Virginia on April 9, 2010. A
series of egregious regulatory violations that the company and the
Mine Safety and Health Administration had left to fester caused the
72
tragedy. The situation was sufficiently disturbing that federal prosecutors began the arduous task of prosecuting the head of security at
the mine, who destroyed evidence and made false statements to investigators, as well as the mine superintendent for his role in perpetuat73
ing rampant and dangerous safety violations.
However, Professor Uhlmann explains, the most effective way to
deter corporate crime is to prosecute the individuals responsible for
the conduct that violated the law and the corporation where they
74
worked. With clearly established and powerful criminal penalties
available to punish companies that fail to ensure compliance, Professor Uhlmann finds no excuse to ignore such prosecutions. For reasons he finds difficult to fathom, the corporation responsible for the
Upper Big Branch disaster—Massey Energy (“Massey”)—escaped
prosecution, apparently through the simple ploy of selling itself to a
75
second company, Alpha Natural Resources (“Alpha”). That company, which had successor liability for all of Massey’s misdeeds, ultimately signed an agreement to pay civil penalties and take remedial action;
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) deceptively described the agreement as “the largest-ever resolution in a criminal investigation of a
76
mine disaster.”
This type of resolution, known as a “deferred” or “nonprosecution” agreement, is increasingly common.
Professor
Uhlmann reports that before 2002, DOJ rarely made such deals, completing only eleven over the previous decade, or roughly one annual77
ly. But during the presidency of George W. Bush and continuing into the Obama administration, the choice of this weak enforcement
tool accelerated, with 129 such deals reached during the Bush years

71. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2013).
72. Id. at 1295–96.
73. Id. at 1298.
74. Id. at 1299.
75. Id. at 1300–01.
76. Id. at 1300.
77. Id. at 1308 n.81.
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and 125 more during President Obama’s first term.
Professor
Uhlmann traces the popularity of this unsatisfactory alternative to
DOJ’s angst over the prosecution of Arthur Andersen, Enron’s ac79
counting firm. When the Supreme Court of the United States overturned the company’s conviction in 2005 based on faulty jury instructions, critics attacked the prosecutors for administering a “corporate
death penalty” that put the firm out of business for no good reason,
80
wiping out 28,000 jobs.
The problem with this reaction, Professor Uhlmann writes, is that
it effectively eliminates the deterrence to corporate criminality that
81
could be achieved by routine criminal charges. He finds unconvincing the dual justifications offered for the deferred and nonprosecution alternative: first, that such deals resolve cases more quickly and efficiently, allowing companies to commit their scarce resources to remediating the results of their misconduct, and, second,
that they avoid the “collateral damage” imposed on such a grand scale
82
by the Andersen fiasco. Rather, he argues, these agreements represent a lazy way out for the DOJ, allowing prosecutors to obtain the
same monetary penalties, factual admissions, corporate cooperation,
and structural reforms without doing the heavy lifting required to
83
prepare a criminal case for court.
By far the most enthusiastic adoption of deferred or nonprosecution agreements has occurred in the mainstream Criminal Division of the DOJ, as opposed to its specialized Environment and Nat84
ural Resources and Antitrust Divisions. The two specialized divisions
have distinguished themselves with considerably more aggressive
prosecutions of corporate crimes than the Criminal Division. Statistics compiled by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), indicate that between 2004 and 2009, the Criminal Division brought
thirty-eight criminal prosecutions against corporations, but entered
85
forty-four deferred and non-prosecution agreements. According to
analyses performed by University of Virginia Professor Brandon Garrett, large, publicly held, domestic corporations benefit from deferred
86
and non-prosecution more often than small or foreign corporations.
78.
79.
80.
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86.
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The types of cases most often covered by such agreements are fraud
87
and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations.
Professor Uhlmann’s bottom line is hard to dispute. As the federal government shrinks in size, driven by deficit reduction and lower
tax revenues, the deterrence provided by aggressive, high-profile enforcement has never been more important. Allowing a company with
as shameful a track record as Massey to escape unscathed sends the
message that is amazingly backed up by these statistics: the bigger a
company and the more egregious its behavior, the better chance it
has of avoiding punishment.
Professor Victor Flatt closes our Symposium with reflections on
why contemporary environmental problems may seem abstract to
88
members of the public. He compares the attention environmental
issues garnered in the 1970s to the changing attitudes that developed
in the 1980s and remain today. At least when it comes to the environment, he argues, harms have come to seem less immediate and
threatening, and therefore are seen as less of a threat to the social order. In such circumstances, the public zeal, which is manifested in
part through calls for better enforcement of laws, has waned.
He focuses throughout on climate change, arguing that contemporary affluence may have masked its threat. Among other hypotheses, he suggests that the world’s people may be dividing into selfperceived “winners” and “losers” with respect to climate, with more
affluent nations such as our own able to avoid its most devastating ef89
Professor Flatt is certainly right that progress on climate
fects.
change has stalled, and he is not the first to suspect that these threats
seem attenuated to developed countries, including and especially our
own. Yet it is hard to imagine that the failures in enforcement and
regulation identified by his co-authors can be connected to such apathy, even if it is a real factor in fluctuating perceptions of the risks of
climate change.
V. CONTINUING THE CROSS-WALK
We hope that the cross-walk we have begun between the increasingly related worlds of financial and health and safety enforcement
will continue, in the academy and in the real world. With both areas
flagging for many of the same reasons, to the strong disadvantage of
87. Id. at 1327 n.189.
88. Victor B. Flatt, Too Big to Jail or Too Abstract (Or Rich?) to Care, 72 MD. L. REV. 1345
(2013).
89. Id. at 1371.
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the public interest, we hope that increasing such self-conscious parallelism will at the very least help advocates of more aggressive prosecution overcome the barriers erected by the special interests that profit
from breaking the law. The alternative is the dangerous sense that
some entities have, indeed, become too big for government to jail,
with their competitors and customers at their mercy to a degree that
is frightening to contemplate.

